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UNWARRANTED POWER AT THE BORDER: THE
INTRUSIVE BODY SEARCH
by Rosemary Ryan Alexander
Every country has the inherent sovereign power to protect its territory
from the invasion of unauthorized persons and merchandise.' Thus, any
traveler desirous of crossing an international border may be the subject of
a border search.2 Border searches are classified as intrusive or nonintru-
sive, depending on the scope of the inspection. Nonintrusive border
searches are limited to examination of a person's wearing apparel and per-
sonal property, and may range from a cursory glance at personal effects to
a thorough inventory of the contents of baggage or vehicle. Intrusive bor-
der searches focus on search of a person's body and body cavities; while an
intrusive search may be restricted to a strip search with visual inspection of
the body surface, it may also progress to manual probing of a body cavity.
The range of intrusiveness possible under the comprehensive term "bor-
der search" allows a customs official to proceed from a minimal invasion,
such as a luggage search, to the serious affront to personal dignity of a
body cavity probe on the mere subjective basis of the officer's personal
observations and interpretation of travelers' suspicious appearances and
behavior.
This Comment considers current customs statutes, which do not militate
against overly intrusive searches,3 and examines the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as it is currently ap-
plied to border searches. Additionally, this Comment proposes an alter-
native procedure to govern initiation of body cavity searches through
1. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (dictum); cf. Witt v. United States,
287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961) (by reason of entry alone, the
United States may search anyone entering the country); see United States v. Glaziou, 402
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
2. United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121
(1969), lists the classes of people who may be searched by customs inspectors: (1) those who
cross the border, (2) those who are employed in the border area, and (3) any person who
engages in suspicious activity in the area of the border; in addition, those who have already
crossed the border and been searched there may again be searched some distance from the
border. 402 F.2d at 13-14. The Glaziou test is: "[Wihen an individual has direct contact
with a border area, or an individual's movements are reasonably related to the border area,
that individual is a member of the class of persons that a customs officer may, if his suspi-
cions are aroused, stop and search .... ." Id (citations omitted). Thus, border searches
include searches conducted at the point of entry and extended border searches, that is,
searches conducted away from the international boundary but inside an elastic border area.
See note 26 infra. The subject of extended border searches is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
3. For a discussion of border searches generally and of the current law's inconsistency
with the fourth amendment, see Comment, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth
Amendment, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 457 (1968).
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judicial issuance of warrants based on showings of clear indication that
contraband is concealed within a body.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
By its prohibition of general searches, the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution protects its citizens from unreasonable search
and seizure.4 Accordingly, general searches have long been held to violate
an individual's fundamental right to privacy. As a procedural safeguard
against unreasonable searches, the fourth amendment has been interpreted
to require that a search warrant be issued by a "neutral and detached mag-
istrate ' only upon a showing that probable cause exists to search.7
The term "border search" has been judicially limited "to distinguish
official searches which are reasonable because made solely in the enforce-
ment of Customs laws from other official searches made in connection with
general law enforcement."8 An effect of this special classification apart
from other searches is that neither probable cause nor a warrant is neces-
sary to initiate a border search.9 A historical justification for the border
search exception to the fourth amendment has been drawn from the chron-
ological circumstances surrounding the adoption of the fourth amendment.
Before the passage of the fourth amendment, the government had the right
to conduct border searches.'° The First Congress passed a revenue statute
in 1789"1 that authorized customs officials to stop and examine any bag-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
5. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927).
6. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115 (1964).
7. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of
those conducting the search, based on trustworthy information, are "sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution" to believe that an offense has been committed.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
8. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977
(1966).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 902 (1977); Perel v. Vanderford, 547 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cam-
eron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Diemler, 498 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Byrd, 483 F.2d
1196 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Summerfield, 421 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1970). Exempted from the warrant require-
ment are stop and frisk searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), automobile searches,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 753 (1969). Recently, the Supreme Court held that the contents of an auto-
mobile which had been taken off the street and impounded could be taken from the car
(inventoried) without probable cause or a warrant authorizing the search. South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
10. The fourth amendment was passed by Congress on Sept. 25, 1789. The first border
search law was passed on July 31, 1789.
11. Act of July 31, 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-1, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789) provided:
[E]very collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially ap-
pointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and author:
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gage, vehicle, or person upon entry into the United States on the suspicion
that contraband, merchandise subject to duty or illegal in nature, was hid-
den. 2 Later, the First Congress rendered the proposed Bill of Rights. 3
This sequence of events has been interpreted as signifying Congress' intent
that the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures contained
in the fourth amendment is not a legal constraint on the discretion of bor-
der agents to conduct searches.' 4 This conclusion, however well-settled,
does not recognize that the congressional imagination at that time could
not foresee that the majority of people subjected to border searches in the
ity, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any
goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to
search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise ....
The Act does not mention intrusive body searches, which were not medically feasible at the
time.
12. Border searches are currently authorized by the following statutes:
19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976):
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any
vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is
merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the
United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in posses-
sion or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise ....
19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1976):
The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations for the search of per-
sons and baggage and he is authorized to employ female inspectors for the
examination and search of persons of their own sex; and all persons coming
into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and
search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under such regula-
tions.
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976):
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehi-
cle at any place in the United States. . . or at any other authorized place...
and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof
and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail
and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compli-
ance.
The power to search for aliens is derived from a statute which does not require suspicion on
the officer's part. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a), (c) (1976). For a discussion of immigration searches,
see Comment, Border Search in the Ninth Circuit. Almeida-Sanchez-A Borderline Decision,
23 HASTINGS L.J. 1309 (1972). The Fifth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that does not
treat border searches and alien searches as separate entities. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1976)
provides that a border patrol agent may be authorized to act simultaneously as a customs
agent. See United States v. Settles, 481 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wright,
476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Border Patrol agents wear
two hats, one as an immigration officer and the other as a customs officer").
13. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 88, 913 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
14. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), stated in dictum:
[T]his act [Act of July 31, 17891 was passed by the same Congress which pro-
posed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, [and] it is
clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of
this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition
of the [fourth] amendment.
Of course, we do not know whether or not the First Congress compared the new customs act
provisions with the standards of the proposed fourth amendment. For a discussion which
criticizes the significance attached to the sequence of passage of the customs act and the




future would be American citizens returning from brief sojourns in Mexico
rather than aliens entering the United States from foreign countries.
The judiciary has consistently recognized that "different rules of law"'
are applicable to the search of persons coming into the United States from
a foreign country 16 since the border search is an exercise of the inherent
sovereign power 7 in the interest of self-protection. The security of the
nation's borders provides a compelling rationale for subjecting everyone
entering the country to a search before admittance.' 8 Thus, the right of
privacy is necessarily restricted and a quantum of invasion is justified on
the mere basis of international travel.
Present judicial willingness to uphold intrusive body searches at the bor-
der may additionally reflect recognition of the difficulty of maintaining
adequate surveillance over the border, 9 exacerbated by the increasing
problem of narcotics smuggling.2" Some judges have hinted that those
who engage in the practice of body smuggling are not as deserving of the
protection of the Constitution as others.
2 1
II. THE NONINTRUSIVE BORDER SEARCH
Under the fourth amendment exemption, most border searches are
made on "mere" or "unsupported suspicion." These two terms have been
used interchangeably to denote the same level of cause.22 This mere sus-
picion or no suspicion criterion applies to the general border search, the
stopping of an individual pursuant to a search of his baggage, vehicle, and
personal items. There is no invasion of the bodily privacy of the traveler
in a general border search.
The minimal invasion of privacy inherent in a general border search of
vehicle and person without a showing of probable cause or issuance of a
warrant is justified by the interest of the government in self-protection and
15. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1962).
17. Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 166 (1853).
18. R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 368 (1961).
19. See generally Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967) (special
treatment afforded border searches is based on a policy recognizing the problem of surveil-
lance of national boundaries); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965) (difficult law enforcement problems at the border support the
exempt classification accorded border searches).
20. See generally Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 945 (1967); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
21. As stated by Judge Chambers, concurring in Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d
745, 754 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958), and quoted by Judge Barnes in
Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966): "[Ilt was Blackford who ... first
takes us into this disgusting sequence. He made the deposit. . . through the anal opening
.... I do not say that the depraved have no rights. But. . .to my sensibilities all of the
shockingness was Blackford's." Judge Ely of the Ninth Circuit criticized this deviance from
equal protection standards: "[Ihf we are to continue to safeguard the innocent and virtuous
from the potential degradation and humiliation of 'strip searches,' we cannot permit our
revulsion. . . to induce our Court to depart from its established principles." United States
v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
22. See Rodriguez-Gonzales v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967); Alexander
v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
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the interest of the public in collection of customs duties. 23 A customs offi-
cial may initiate a general search without suspicion that the subject is
smuggling contraband. 4 Cause to search has been stated to exist by rea-
son of the subject's crossing the border and by the requirements of national
security.25 Most general border searches, however, are made on the basis
of the observations of an experienced customs official whose suspicions
have been aroused by a nervous traveler. These searches are routinely
conducted and upheld because of the official's "mere suspicion."2 6
III. INTRUSIVE BORDER SEARCHES
A. The Strip Search
Because of the increasing frequency of travelers' smuggling contraband
in their undergarments and body cavities,27 customs officials have re-
sponded with intrusive border searches consisting of the strip, or skin,
search and the body cavity search.28 A customs agent may examine a
23. The power to regulate the entry of foreign goods was early recognized as a necessary
exercise of the right of the sovereign. Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 166 (1853).
24. "No question of whether there is probable cause for a search exists when the search
is incidental to the crossing of an international border, for there is reason and probable
cause to search every person entering the United States from a foreign country, by reason of
such entry alone." Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
950 (1961); see, e.g., King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 926 (1965); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Murgia v. United
States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961); Landau v. United
States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D.
Cal. 1952).
25. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Appellant was charged with a viola-
tion of the Prohibition laws. The Court upheld the warrantless search and in dictum ap-
proved the border search exception. Id. at 154.
26. A border search encompasses not only a search made at a geographical point of
entry but, under certain circumstances, a search made away from the boundary, an extended
border search. Although extended border searches are not conducted at the border, the
purpose of the search is the same as of a border search. See, e.g., United States v. Warner,
441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Alexander v. United States, 362
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966). The place where an extended border
search occurs has been termed the "functional equivalent" of the border. Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1976) authorizes searches
made without a warrant or on less than probable cause only if made within a reasonable
distance of the border). See also United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1973)
(search held valid when customs agents followed a truck for over five days before stopping
and searching the vehicle 150 miles inland from the border); United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1970) (search of a truck two miles from the marina where the truck was ob-
served loading boxes from a vessel which had crossed the U.S. international boundary up-
held as a border search); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1121 (1969) (search of two French seamen as they were leaving the pier where their
vessel was docked upheld as a border search); Sutis, The Extent ofthe Border, 1 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 235, 237-50 (1974); Note, Fourth Amendment Applications to Searches Con-
ducted by Immigration OJcAials, 38 ALB. L. REV. 962, 971-74 (1974).
27. Blackford v. Umted States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914
(1958), was the first appeal of a conviction of illegally importing and concealing narcotics
based on evidence obtained from a body cavity probe at the border.
28. The rectum is the most often used cavity for smuggling. The vagina also is fre-
uently used. At least 93 grams of heroin can be hidden in a woman's vagina. See Hen-
erson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 1967). See also United States v.
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); United States v.
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person's outer clothing during the course of a routine border search, even
without cause. In contrast, a traveler may be forced to disrobe only if a
customs official can show "real suspicion"29 or "reasonable suspicion
' 30
that contraband is concealed on a suspect's body.3 Some examples of
suspicion that have been found to support strip searches are an informer's
tip32 or an overly bulky, suspicious appearance of a suspect's clothing.
33
To date only the Ninth Circuit 34 has adopted the real suspicion standard,
35
which was announced in Henderson v. United States.36 The facts of the
case revealed that the defendant was subjected first to a strip search and
thereafter to a body cavity search which revealed a cache of heroin. The
strip search was initiated because the customs agent erroneously believed
the defendant had been searched on a prior occasion and found to be car-
rying narcotics in her purse. The agent had not attempted to verify his
recollection before the commencement of the strip search, and since no
independent facts existed to suggest contraband on the defendant's person,
the court invalidated the strip search as an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy. It stated that examination beyond a search of the victim's
outer clothing or contents of his personal effects requires a higher standard
Carter, 480 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1973). It has been estimated that one fifth of all drugs smug-
gled from Mexico are concealed in body cavities. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745,
752 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958). Contraband is occasionally swal-
lowed. See, e.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
29. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). Prior to Henderson a
strip search based on "mere" suspicion was held lawful in Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d
389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961). Customs officers received a tip describing a
particular car as possibly carrying heroin. A description of the passengers was not pro-
vided. The Witt court upheld the strip search of the female appellant, stating that "[m]ere
suspicion has been held enough cause for search at the border." 287 F.2d at 391 (citing
Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800, 803 n.5" (9th Cir. 1959)). The court also pointed to
current customs laws, 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1976), which provide for women to be searched by
female customs inspectors as evidence of the implied congressional intent that such searches
could be conducted. 287 F.2d at 391 & n.I.
30. United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902
(1977).
31. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). See also United
States v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645 (5th
Cir. 1973). A traveler may be required to remove his coat without a showing of real suspi-
cion by the customs officer. Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
32. United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
33. United States v. Berard, 281 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1968). A strip search standard
has not been developed in any circuit other than the Fifth and Ninth. See United States v.
Flores, 477 F.2d 608 (Ist Cir. 1973).
34. Most border search cases arise in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, whose jurisdictions
include the California-Mexico border and the Texas-Mexico border, respectively. See notes
49-71 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the Fifth Circuit's standard applicable
to strip searches and comparison of this with the Ninth Circuit standard. Other courts look
to these circuits when deciding a border search case. See, e.g., United States v. Glaziou, 402
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); United States v. Pedersen, 300 F.
Supp. 669 (D. Vt. 1969).
35. The fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure en-
compasses two phases of a search: whether or not it is reasonable to initiate the search and
the reasonableness of the search itself.
36. 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967). See notes 102-03 infra and accompanying text for




The real suspicion test was further delineated in United States v.
Guadalupe-Garza."8 In that case the defendant, who had already passed
one inspector, was strip searched by a subsequent agent because he suspi-
ciously turned his head to the side. The court invalidated the search be-
cause the agent's suspicions were without any objective factual basis. The
court further noted that a traveler at the border does not have an expecta-
tion of a strip search. The court refined the Henderson proposition that
actual suspicion is required for a strip search:
'Real suspicion' . . . is subjective suspicion supported by objective,
articulable facts that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent
customs official to suspect that a particular person . . . is concealing
something on his body . . . . [S]imple good faith on the part of the
customs official in entertaining subjective suspicion unsupported by
objective facts does not convert 'mere suspicion' into real suspicion.
The Ninth Circuit also upheld a strip search based on real suspicion in
United States v. Summelfleld.4° Customs agents noticed the defendant's
extreme nervousness, fresh needle marks on his arms, and contracted
pupils." Further, a search of the defendant's wallet revealed three rolled
up cotton balls which were of the kind frequently used by narcotics
users.4 2 In United States v. Shields43 a strip search was upheld because of
the customs agent's observation of the presence of needle marks on the
defendant's arms and his unusual nervousness. As in other cases, the
short duration of the defendant's visit to Mexico was also a suspicious
fact."
The fact situation which provokes the suspicions of the inspecting offi-
cial must be capable of being categorized into specific observations which,
when accumulated, "bear some reasonable relationship to suspicion that
something is concealed on the body of the person to be searched., 45 For
instance, indications that contraband is concealed in an automobile in
which a suspect is riding do not provide the requisite real suspicion to
validate a strip search of the suspect because the indications do not point
to a smuggling offense or the suspicion that contraband is concealed on the
suspect's body.46 In Guadalupe-Garza the fact that the defendant turned
his head to one side in a shy manner was held not to constitute an objec-
tive, articulable fact that would lead a customs official to suspect that the
victim harbored contraband on his body. Also, if the facts creating the
37. 390 F.2d at 808.
38. 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 879.
40. 421 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 685.
42. Id.
43. 453 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1972). See notes 116-18 infra and accompanying text for
discussion of this case in the body cavity search context.
44. 453 F.2d at 1236.
45. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
46. United States v. Williams, 459 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1972).
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original suspicion are discovered to be erroneous, the search must be dis-
continued instantly.47
In formulating the standards which govern intrusive searches, the Ninth
Circuit measured the intrusion into individual privacy against the govern-
ment's need for an effective means to combat smuggling.4" Significantly,
however, the courts do not view the strip search as violative of human
dignity, and thus are likely to uphold the search based on the government's
greater need.
The standard presently applicable to the initiation of strip searches in
the Fifth Circuit is not based on as much case law. Until recently,49 only
one strip search case had been reported, United States v. Forbicetta.50 As
the appellant was returning from a trip to Colombia, she was stopped in
the Miami airport because the customs agents concluded that she matched
a "smuggling profile." The suspect wore a loose fitting dress and it was
the observation of the customs authorities that the usual female airline
traveler wore tight fitting clothes. In addition, the suspect had nothing to
declare and carried only one suitcase for a trip to Colombia, a place where
she had no relatives." A strip search resulted in the discovery of two and
one-half pounds of cocaine concealed in the defendant's girdle. In af-
firming the smuggling conviction, the Fifth Circuit stated that the border
search was legal based on precedent. 2 The cases relied on by the
Forbicetta court did not address the issue of requisite suspicion standards
pertaining to the initiation of strip searches; rather, the cases cited for sup-
port involved nonintrusive extended border search situations arising in the
Fifth Circuit.5 3 Although there was no strip. search precedent in the Fifth
47. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 427 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1973). Defendant was ob-
served to have an unusual bulge in the area of her midsection. The customs official, guess-
ing that the suspect was wearing a belt full of narcotics, ordered the suspect to strip.
Pursuant to the strip, it became obvious that the suspicious protrusion was body fat, but the
inspector ordered that the search continue. Narcotics were discovered in the suspect's un-
derwear. The court held that although the outward appearance of the defendant validated
the strip search, the search should have ceased when the bulge was verified as body tissue
because the specific suspicion upon which the search was based was cleared.
A search reasonable at its beginning may violate the fourth amendment if the original
valid search progresses beyond its original scope. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353
U.S. 346 (1957).
48. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1970).
49. The most recent strip search case reported in the Fifth Circuit is United States v.
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). See notes 57-68
infra and accompanying text.
50. 484 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
51. 484 F.2d at 646.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973) (upheld airport search of
baggage which revealed marijuana pursuant to positive magnetometer reading); United
States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973) (search of car and marijuana discovery
upheld as car was on a road frequently used to smuggle aliens, thus providing the border
patrol with the requisite reasonable suspicion); United States v. Maggard, 451 F.2d 502 (5th
Cir. 1971) (car stopped after it passed checkpoint when it was noticed to be unusually
low-reasonable suspicion to search for aliens); United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.
1970) (seizure of liquor from panel truck upheld as based on reasonable suspicion as truck
observed loading from ship which had crossed international boundary); Rodriguez v. United
[Vol. 321012
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Circuit, the court did not refer to the strip search standard of the Ninth
Circuit. 4 Instead, the court equated the suspicion necessary to initiate a
strip search of a suspect's body with the standard applicable to his lug-
gage.55 The only language in the opinion acknowledging any difference
between a nonintrusive border search and an intrusive body search re-
ferred to the fact that this was not a body cavity search. 6
The most recent case in which the Fifth Circuit considered strip
searches, United States v. Himmelwright,57 suggests a trend towards nar-
rowing the standard governing the initiation of strip searches. Agents had
observed that the suspect was excessively calm,5" was wearing platform
shoes,59 offered conflicting information regarding her employment,60 and
had been in Colombia an unusually short period of time. A strip search
revealed an object protruding from the defendant's vagina; upon the re-
quest of the inspectress, the defendant removed 105 grams of cocaine from
her vagina. At no time did the agent touch the suspect's body.6' In up-
holding the search the court described the real suspicion test of the Ninth
Circuit, but concluded that it could not follow their specific approach.62
The court discussed the reasons for rejecting the fixed standard of the
Ninth Circuit. The court noted the "inherent indefiniteness" of the terms
"real suspicion," which is necessary to validate a strip search, and "clear
indication," which must be present before the official may proceed with a
body cavity search. In addition, the court reasoned that it was not always
clear where to draw the line between body cavity searches and strip
searches in order to determine which test to apply.63 In a footnote, the
opinion illustrated this point by comparing two Ninth Circuit cases involv-
ing substantially the same search, one case classifying the search as a body
States, 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1961) (affirmed conviction of defendant who crossed the bor-
der without registering as one is required to do if convicted of violating marijuana laws).
54. 484 F.2d at 646. The only intrusive body search case cited was United States v.
Briones, 423 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970), which upheld a stomach search by the administration
of an emetic solution based on an informant's tip that the defendant would attempt to smug-
gle heroin in his stomach. The court held the search to be reasonable under either the mere
suspicion or clear indication standard. Id.
55. The court relied on a case upholding the search of an airline passenger who
matched a skyjacking profile, United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). The
Skipwith search, however, ended with the emptying of the suspect's pants pockets, which
produced a bag of cocaine. By relying on this case, the Forbicetia court seemingly equated
the level of suspicion necessary for the emptying of one's pockets with a strip search.
56. 484 F.2d at 646-47.
57. 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
58. Apparently, customs officials expect a modicum of nervousness to be exhibited by
the ordinary passenger coming into customs over to what extent their personal effects will be
investigated; therefore, an extremely calm or an overly nervous person arouses suspicions of
border agents. See 551 F.2d at 992 n.l.
59. During their popularity, platform shoes became a frequent cache for smuggled con-
traband.
60. Himmelwright first told the officers that she was a secretary. She then purported to
be an agent for an insurance company. The last occupation she claimed was that of a
cocktail waitress. 551 F.2d at 992-93.
61. Id. at 993.
62. Id. at 995.
63. Id.
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cavity search and the other case as a strip search.6 4
The Himmewright court instead adopted the "reasonable suspicion"
standard for strip searches because it was more flexible and could still pro-
vide the full protection of the fourth amendment.65 The court then de-
scribed a requirement of the reasonable suspicion standard:
'[R]easonable suspicion' in this context includes a requirement that
customs officials have cause to suspect that contraband exists in the
particular place which the officials decide to search.. . . [A] genera-
lized suspicion of criminal activity such as . . .when one closely re-
sembles a 'smuggling profile' will nqt normally in itself permit a
reasonable conclusion that a strip search should occur.66
The court's reference to the insufficiency of a suspect's close resemblance
to a smuggling profile to uphold the initiation of a strip search narrows the
Forbicetta interpretation of the requisite standard.67 It is clear that the
Forbicella interpretation equating a general border search with the initia-
tion of a strip search, has been superseded by Himmelwright. The latter
opinion reflects a recognition of the difference in its statement that the in-
trusion of a strip search is much greater than the intrusion occasioned by a
customs official's search of baggage or inspection of a visa.68
Distinguishing the real suspicion test of the Ninth Circuit from the rea-
sonable suspicion test as recently announced by the Fifth Circuit is less a
matter of differing substantive standards, as they are difficult to differenti-
ate in the abstract, and more a matter of applying the law to the facts.6 9
The Fifth Circuit, more than the Ninth, has strained to find border search
law applicable to a particular search.7° Facts can be more easily inter-
preted to constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion than real suspicion.
This distinction will become either more or less apparent, depending on
the Fifth Circuit's future application of the reasonable suspicion test as
delineated by Himmewright"7 to the initiation of strip searches.
64. Id. at 995 n. I1 (discussing United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974)
(characterized as a body cavity search); United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973)
(characterized as a strip search)).
65. 551 F.2d at 995. In holding that the reasonable suspicion standard governed the
initiation of strip searches, the court stated that several other courts had adopted the "real"
or "reasonable" suspicion standard and then cited Perel v. Vanderford, 547 F.2d 278 (5th
Cir. 1977), as the most recent example in the Fifth Circuit. 551 F.2d at 994; see note 69
infra.
66. 551 F.2d at 995 (emphasis in original).
67. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
68. 551 F.2d at 994.
69. In the case preceding Hirmelwright the Fifth Circuit upheld the refusal of the dis-
trict court to charge the jury that the lawfulness of a strip search at the border depended
upon a showing of probable cause. "It has been held in this circuit... that real or reason-
able suspicion is the proper standard governing strip searches at the border." Perel v. Van-
derford, 547 F.2d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). Note that the court used the
"real" or "reasonable" terms interchangeably.
70. Compare United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977), with United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir.
1970).
71. The Fifth Circuit also applies a "reasonable suspicion" standard to extended border
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B. The Body Cavity Search
When an object is either illegal or subject to duty, smugglers frequently
employ their bodies to secrete the contraband.72 For example, varying
types of narcotics and gems are swallowed 73 or secreted in the vagina or
rectum. The increased practice of using body cavities for this purpose has
prompted the body cavity search, which includes, besides the cavity probe,
the use of emetics or stomach pumps.74 Procedures which induce vomit-
ing are less acceptable to the courts than probing, which is considered a
more common practice presenting fewer, if any, hazards. Courts that
have considered the reasonableness of the search itself view any pain ac-
companying a rectal examination as more acceptable than pain involved in
stomach pumping because the accused made the original decision to de-
posit the contraband in his rectum and would necessarily inflict some type
of pain on himself in removing the hidden substance.75
The legality of extracting evidence from a body cavity was first consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California,76 in which the Court
considered the reasonableness of a search effected through the use of a
stomach pump.77 Narcotics officers who had broken into the defendant's
room saw the defendant place two narcotics capsules into his mouth. The
officers failed to prevent him from swallowing the substance. Subsequent
pumping of the defendant's stomach recovered the evidence. The defend-
ant's conviction for the illegal possession of morphine was reversed by the
Supreme Court on the grounds that admission of this evidence violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,78 even though the proce-
searches. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. See McIntyre & Chabraja, The Intensive Search of a Suspect's Body and Clothing, 58
J. CRIM. L. 18, 23 (1967), contending that the Constitution does not give anyone a right to
use his body to secrete contraband.
73. There is some danger in swallowing narcotics. If the container (usually a rubber
condom) should rupture, instant death could result. Further, medical testimony in Blefare
v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1966), reveals that packets of heroin can
decompose in a human body.
74. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
75. See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 754 (9th Cir. 1957) (concurring opin-
ion). For discussion of certain medical procedures and the judiciary's objection to the pain
involved, see 58 COLUM. L. REv. 565 (1958); 9 HASTINGS L.J. 227 (1958).
76. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). It should be noted that the decision in Rochin was based on
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and not upon the search and seizure
clause of the fourth amendment. See note 78 infra.
77. Previously, federal appeals courts considering the question had generally sup-
pressed such evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949)
(stomach pumping to recover narcotic evidence). Typically, the courts were offended by the
notion that evidence was forcibly removed from the human body. For example, in Willis
the court stated: "We can find, in no reported case, nor have we ever heard before, that an
officer acting under the authority of the United States government,. and sworn to uphold the
Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment, has participated in a search such as this."
Id. at 747.
78. Id. The exclusion of the evidence was held the proper remedy because of the
Supreme Court's earlier ruling that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible under the
province of the fourth amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Exclu-
sion of evidence also applies to state seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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dure was an approved medical practice and, when properly administered,
should not be painful. The Court expressed its shock at the policemen's
methods, stating:
It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of
constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to
convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind
but can extract what is in his stomach . . . . This is conduct that
shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the peti-
tioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents . . . are methods too
79close to the rack and the screw ....
Thus, the standard applied under the due process clause is whether the
search process shocked the conscience or offended a sense of justice. In
upholding a rectal probe as reasonable in a border search context, Black-
ford v. United States8" held that the search and seizure itself, incident to a
lawful arrest, must comport in nature and scope with the reasonableness
standard of the fourth amendment.8 The court emphasized that this
standard was more stringent than that applied to state proceedings under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment set forth in Rochin.s2
The suspect in Blackford voluntarily removed his coat revealing numerous
puncture marks in the veins of his arms. He then admitted to the customs
officer that he used narcotics occasionally and had been convicted previ-
ously on narcotics charges. The defendant willingly disrobed and the in-
spector noted a greasy substance around the suspect's rectum.83  After
interrogation, the defendant admitted that he was carrying heroin encased
in a rubber condom in his rectum, and, following several unsuccessful at-
tempts to remove the contraband himself, he was arrested. A forcible
Rochin was decided before Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which held that
governmental intrusions into the human body constitute searches and seizure subject to the
protection of the fourth amendment. See notes 94-97 infra and accompanying text.
79. 342 U.S. at 172-73.
80. 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958). The court stated:
"There is nothing in the Bill of Rights which makes body cavities a legally protected sanctu-
ary for narcotics. It is not per se violative of the Constitution to remove foreign matter from
body cavities. . . ." 247 F.2d at 753. Blackford was the first appellate case to challenge a
body cavity probe at the border. Standards governing strip and body cavity searches did
not evolve until 1966. See Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967).
81. "The Fourth Amendment ... makes no differentiation between persons and prop-
erty. It does not value property over human anatomy, nor differentiate between them."
247 F.2d at 750.
Blackford preceded Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the fourth amendment's protection as applied to bodily intru-
sion. See notes 94-97 infra and accompanying text.
82. 247 F.2d at 750. Rochin, decided under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, was a state action. The exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment did not
apply to state searches at the time. See note 78 supra and note 95 infra.
83. This is a strong indication to a customs inspector that something is being secreted in
a body cavity. Smugglers frequently apply a lubricant to the body orifice to facilitate inser-
tion of the contraband. See, e.g., United States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271, 273 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); United States v. Velasquez, 469 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir.




search of the defendant's rectum performed by a physician resulted in re-
covery of the heroin. The degree of suspicion necessary to initiate the
search was not discussed because the authorities proceeded with the sus-
pect's consent until he was arrested. The court held that the search itself
was reasonable, emphasizing that the officers used only slight force, took
medical precautions, and knew "what and how much was where."84 The
Blackford court did not address the indignity of the search; rather, in hold-
ing the search reasonable, it stressed the medically approved, routine pro-
cedure and sanitary conditions incident to the search.
The imposition of a stricter standard than due process on body cavity
searches was followed in Blefare v. United States.8' The defendant previ-
ously had admitted to Canadian officials that he carried heroin in his
stomach from the United States into Canada. American border officials at
the United States-Mexican border were informed of this fact and asked to
be on the alert. The defendant and his companion were stopped, identi-
fied, and taken to a search room. After officials observed recent needle
marks on their arms, they were taken to a hospital. 86  The defendant
drank an emetic solution and regurgitated an object but reswallowed it. A
tube was then forcibly passed through his nose and throat, and into his
stomach. Two packets of heroin were finally expelled. The search was
upheld as being reasonable. The Blefare court distinguished Rochin on
the ground that a border search was involved. The concurring opinions in
Blefare and Blackford suggested as an additional consideration that since
the defendant so degraded himself by concealing narcotics in such a man-
ner, it was not unreasonable to administer a procedure to recover the con-
traband that the defendant would have administered to himself.87
84. 247 F.2d at 753.
85. 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
86. Because border searches do not have to be performed exactly at the border line, the
search conducted in Blefare was considered a border search. See King v. United States, 348
F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 946 (1964); Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1959). The right to a border search diminishes once a suspect is far past the border.
Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965); Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1961). A search still qualifies as a border search if the defendant is kept under
surveillance from the time he leaves the border, even if lost from sight for a short time.
Leeks v. United States,, 356 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1963), cerl. denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964). The Supreme Court recently addressed
the problem of roving border patrols searching for illegal aliens in United States v. Marti.
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), and United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). A leading
case in the Ninth Circuit holds that a border search will result if there is reason to believe
that there has been no change in the condition of the automobile from the time it crossed the
border until it was stopped. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966). For a discussion of the application of the Alexander search, see
Note, From Bags to Body Cavities.: The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 57-62
(1974).
87. "It does not.shock my conscience to require a defendant to do, under careful medi-
cal supervision, that which defendant himself willingly and knowingly proposed to do, with-
out medical supervision, for his own selfish pleasure ....... Blefare v. United States, 362
F.2d at 878 (Barnes, J., concurring); see note 21 supra for the Blackford language.
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Blackford went beyond the due process standard announced in Rochin
by imposing an additional fourth amendment restriction of reasonableness
on the search.88 Following Blackford, the standard of reasonableness ap-
plied by the courts to the nature and extent of body cavity searches at the
border was based on the Blackford interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment.89  The reasonableness requirement under the fourth amendment
pertains to the reasonableness of the initiation of the search and the rea-
sonableness of the search, including the manner and scope of the search. 9°
Although the reasonableness of the initiation of an intrusive body search
need not meet the probable cause requirement, the analysis of some courts
addressing the initiation issue falls within the sphere of probable cause.
In Blefare v. United States9 the court conceded that a finding of probable
cause is not a prerequisite to initiation of a valid border search, and justi-
fied the pumping of the defendant's stomach on the basis of the reasona-
bleness standard.92 Nevertheless, the court's analysis was based on
evidence that meets the probable cause test: the agents witnessed the de-
fendant reswallow an object which he had regurgitated and recognized
him as a known addict who had made a prior admission of smuggling on
other occasions.93
The initiation of intrusive body searches in a nonborder context was
addressed by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California,94 involving a
challenge to the constitutionality of an involuntary extraction of a blood
sample. The Court held that governmental intrusions into the human
body constitute searches and seizures and are subject to the fourth amend-
ment standard of reasonableness. 95 Regarding the issue of the quantum
of suspicion necessary to initiate a bodily invasion, the Court said:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amend-
ment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that de-
sired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication
that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human
interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may
88. "There may be, we conceive, conduct which, while unreasonable, is not so uncon-
scionable that it 'shocks the conscience'. . . . On the other hand, if conduct is reasonable, it
must perforce satisfy Due Process requirements." 247 F.2d at 750.
89. Examples of post-Blackford, pre-Schmerber configurations of the standard of rea-
sonableness are Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), and Denton v. United
States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962). The Lane court held that "[a]dministering emetics to
cause vomiting in order to recover narcotics is not an unreasonable search of the person."
321 F.2d at 576. In Denton, which involved a rectal probe, the court stated that there was
nothing unreasonable about the entire examination, considering the circumstances. 310
F.2d at 133.
90. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42 (1966).
91. 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
92. Id. at 874.
93. Id. at 871, 874 & 876.
94. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
95. Id. at 767. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), applied the reasonableness stan-
dard of the fourth amendment to state searches and seizures. Not until Schmerber, how-
ever, did the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment clearly apply to bodily
intrusions conducted as state and federal searches and seizures.
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disappear unless there is an immediate search.9 6
Schmerber, if applied to a border search, clearly mandates that a body
cavity probe could be justified only by a clear indication that the body
contained contraband.97
Following Schmerber's holding that bodily intrusion based on mere
chance that evidence would be found violated the fourth amendment, 98 the
Ninth Circuit in Rivas v. United States9 9 applied the clear indication test of
Schmerber 'I to the initiation of a border search. The defendant in Rivas
concealed narcotics in his rectum. He appeared to be nervous and the
customs official observed what he believed were fresh needle marks. An-
other customs official searched Rivas, who refused to spread his buttocks
for inspection. It was thus concluded that Rivas was concealing contra-
band in his rectum and he was taken to a doctor's office. Rivas refused to
permit the doctor to perform a rectal search and was arrested by the cus-
toms officer for impeding a federal officer in the performance of his duty.
The examination was then performed using physical force. The Ninth
Circuit found that the initiation of the search of the defendant's rectum
was not unreasonable and affirmed his conviction. The clear indication
test was met by a combination of facts: Rivas was a registered user of nar-
cotics and was under the influence of narcotics when he crossed the border.
The court explained the mere suspicion would not have been an acceptable
basis for a body cavity search at the border, and that a body cavity search
was not justified merely because it was performed at the border. Rivas
required that a plain suggestion or clear indication of smuggling be present
for a body cavity search to be legal."'
In Henderson v. United States °2 the clear indication standard adopted
by Rivas was affirmed in a vaginal search case. In contrast to the facts
presented in Rivas, there were no circumstances present in the border
crossing to arouse suspicion. The suspect was subjected to a strip search
because of the border official's mistaken recollection that the defendant
had previously been arrested for carrying narcotics. Because Henderson
did not cooperate with the search, it was concluded that she was smuggling
something in her vagina. About three ounces of heroin was later found
while in a doctor's office. The Henderson examination was not upheld
because it was performed before the clear indication requirement was met.
The court commented that the custom official's recollection was not only
too removed in time, but also based merely on the suspect's physical ap-
pearance, not her name. Further, the alleged prior event, though errone-
ous, did not even involve the use of a body cavity. The suspicion of the
96. 384 U.S. at 769-70.
97. Id. at 767-70. The four dissents in Schmerber urged that the majority did not go far
enough in protecting the sanctity of the body. Id. at 772-79. An extraction of a blood
sample is less affronting to one's individual privacy than a body cavity search.
98. Id. at 769-70.
99. 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966).
100. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
101. 368 F.2d at 710.
102. 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
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agent could have been verified through facilities at the border station;
however, no attempt was made to do this. 0 3 The court stated that if a
strip search were required, then something more must be shown, that is, "a
real suspicion directed specifically to that person.' Further, if there
were more than an examination of the surface of the naked body, such as a
manual opening of a body cavity for inspection, then there should exist at
least a "clear indication" that the evidence would be found.' 5 In dictum
the court stated that a strip search ended and a body cavity probe began
when a suspect manually opened her vagina for visual examination to de-
termine if she had something secreted."°
Post-Henderson cases show widespread adoption of the clear indication
standard and its application in varying contexts. In Morales v. United
States,0 7 the first case to interpret Henderson, the defendant had been
singled out for a strip search because an informer warned the authorities
that the car in which she was riding had been observed the same day at the
residence of a known narcotics dealer.' 8 During the strip search, Morales
was forced to bend over and expose her vaginal area. Something "sort of
like a bubble" was observed protruding from her vagina. The defendant
was taken to a doctor, who, after finding no indication of drug use, per-
formed a vaginal search and discovered a packet of heroin. This evidence
was suppressed because the standard for body cavity probes was not satis-
fied.'O9 The search was not justified on the basis of what was disclosed by
the vaginal search and there was no clear indication present prior to the
strip search.
On the issue of when a strip search ends and a body cavity search be-
gins,"10 the Morales decision cited Henderson for the proposition that
"when the cavity to be searched is a vagina, the cavity search commences
with the visual inspection." ' In Henderson, however, after the inspec-
tress performed a visual examination of the defendant's body, she ordered
the defendant to bend over and separate her buttocks with her hands so as
to allow inspection of her vagina." 2 The decision that this search was
illegal turned on the requirement that the vagina be manually opened." 3
The Morales opinion does not explain how the defendant exposed her vag-
103. Id. at 809.
104. Id. at 808.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969).
108. Id. at 1300.
109. Id. at 1299. That female officials preside over strip searches of female suspects is
mandatory. 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1976). But see United States v. Carter, 480 F.2d 981 (9th
Cir. 1973) (two male customs officials present during a portion of defendant's strip search
because defendant fought with the inspectress).
110. The Fifth Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit's standards governing the initiation of
strip and body cavity searches because of the difficulty of determining which standard to
apply. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
111. 406 F.2d at 1299.
112. 390 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1967).
113. "[I]f in the course of the search of a woman there is to be a requirement that she
manually open her vagina for visual inspection to see if she has something concealed there,
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inal area,"I4 describing merely that the defendant was required "to bend
over and expose her vaginal area.""' 5 The court does not state whether it
is visual inspection of the vaginal cavity or inspection of the vaginal area
that marks the initiation of the body cavity search.
United States v. Shields".6 sanctioned a strip search during which
Shields, the defendant, was required to bend over. A condom containing
heroin was observed extending from the defendant's vagina. In upholding
the search, the court stated that there was real suspicion to support the
strip search and the condom was discovered during the course of the skin
search." '7 In an apparent effort to ignore the ambiguity presented in
Morales concerning vaginal observation, the court stated that since the
defendant was asked only to turn away and bend over, there was nothing
to indicate that "this action alone was sufficient to expose the external vag-
inal area."'' 8
In United States v. Holtz" 9 the defendant was required to bend over and
spread her buttocks. With Holtz in this position, a prophylactic was ob-
served hanging down from her vagina. The court held that the discovery
of the prophylactic occurred during a strip search and that only a real sus-
picion, present in this case, was necessary. 120  The court interpreted the
Henderson rule to mean that absent a clear indication of contraband
within a body cavity, "[oinly an examination by means of a manual or
visual intrusion into the cavity itself was forbidden."' 2' A body cavity
search began not by mere observation of the vaginal area, but only when
the vaginal cavity was visually penetrated. The court said that examina-
tion of the genital surface was not precluded by Morales and Henderson
since those cases were limited to visual inspections of the vaginal cavity.
The court further distinguished Morales in that there was no evidence
that the inspectress was performing a body cavity search of Holtz. It was
stated that during the visual exam with the defendant in the bent-down
position, the inspectress was not required to confine her gaze to the rectal
area as contraband could have been taped to the defendant's crotch. 1
22
These Ninth Circuit cases on body cavity search demonstrate that if one
has real suspicion to justify the strip search, the anal area may be visually
examined during the skin search. Observations made during the skin
search may provide the clear indication to search internally. What re-
mains is a rectal-vaginal distinction. Present case law sanctions the visual
we think that we should require more than a mere suspicion." Id. at 808; see United States
v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 93 (9th Cir. 1973).
114. Other Ninth Circuit courts have noted the ambiguity of the Morales facts as re-
ported. United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 93 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Shields, 453
F.2d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
115. 406 F.2d at 1299.
116. 453 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
117. Id. at 1236-37.
118. Id. at 1237.
119. 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973).
120. Id. at 94.
121. Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 93.
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inspection of the rectum, but not the vagina, during the course of a strip
search.' 23 It seems that the classification of the two body cavities under
the same standard would be more satisfactory. 24  To label the require-
ment to bend over to reveal the rectal area a strip search is nonsensical.
IV. PROPOSED CLEAR INDICATION STANDARD AND WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
The judiciary has not yet determined that its supervision over the initia-
tion of intrusive border searches is necessary to insure constitutionally per-
missible searches, 21 even though similar proposals have been previously
made. 126 The current minimum safeguards of personal dignity governing
initiation of such searches do not adequately protect the thousands of in-
nocent travelers who transverse our borders every year. A physician in
the Morales case who had performed many body cavity searches at the
request of border officials testified that he found contraband in only fifteen
to twenty percent of the accused that he examined.' 27  The guilty have
more protection than the innocent because evidence illegally seized is sup-
pressed in a smuggling prosecution by operation of the exclusionary
rule.' 28  The accosted innocent person has no remedy against the federal
government because of sovereign immunity and the false arrest and bat-
tery exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 129  Further, the wronged
victim has no action for deprivation of rights by state officials under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 since customs officials are federal officers.' 30  A
123. See, e.g., United States v. Summerfield, 421 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1970).
124. See Note, supra note 86, at 79.
125. See, e.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
945 (1967).
126. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
"When time permits and when the contemplated search procedure is extreme, if not shock-
ingly offensive, the search, if made without authority therefor having been sought of a mag-
istrate, is unreasonable. ... Id. at 887. See also Comment, Intrusive Border Searches-Is
Judicial Control Desirable, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 276 (1966).
127. Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298, 1300 n.2 (9th Cir. 1969). United States v.
Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ely, J., dissenting), presented the following data
from Metropolitan News, June 28, 1972, at 1, col. 3, reporting hearings conducted by a
California representative:
'[O]f the 1,800 women stripped and searched [during a certain period] only
285 [approximately 16percentj were found carrying any contraband, and very
few concealing it in body cavities.
[Several women testifed [sic] that they were subjected to humiliating body
cavity probes by nonmedical personnel under the most unsanitary conditions.'
A recent example of a potentially unwarranted invasion can be found in the facts of United
States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 53-56
supra. A woman, traveling alone, wearing platform shoes, returned from a brief stay in
Colombia. The woman's appearance and extreme calmness precipitated a strip search. Al-
though narcotics were fortuitously discovered, the same set of circumstances could have
involved an innocent person.
128. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1967) (citing
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (fruit of the poisonous tree)).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(n) (1976).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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civil suit against the offending customs officer is possible on the authority
of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,' 3' but the adequacy of a civil remedy
against the offending customs agent depends on the defendant's ability to
satisfy the judgment.
Since a border search does not require a showing of probable cause, the
possible need for a warrant in body cavity searches has not been ade-
quately addressed. Nevertheless, the present lack of satisfactory after-the-
fact redress available to the innocent victim may be mitigated by the impo-
sition of a procedural safeguard against the initiation of intrusive body
searches. The result would be fewer improper searches.
The Ninth Circuit in Huguez v. United States'32 advocated imposition of
a warrant requirement, stating:
Extreme internal body searches, especially forcible, intrusive rectal
cavity invasions,. . . perhaps should be authorized only upon the is-
suance of search warrants under appropriate judicial scrutiny ....
Why any less protection should be given to the human body than to
the human home is difficult to explain, even in the context of a border
search.133
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Holtz134 Judge Ely sug-
gested a limited warrant requirement as a prerequisite to the invasion of
any body cavity. Under Judge Ely's proposal a warrant would issue only
when a magistrate determined that there existed a clear indication that
contraband was hidden within the body.'35
In a nonborder case, Camara v. Municipal Court,'3 6 the Supreme Court
held that safety inspections by building inspectors without a warrant were
"significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." ' 37  The Court required the issuance of a search warrant prior to
these administrative searches of buildings. Significantly, the protection
thus afforded in Camara to the buildings has not been deemed a proper
safeguard for innocent people in the border search context.'
38
131. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens was awarded money damages despite the fact that
there was no statutory authorization for such a federal cause of action for embarrassment,
humiliation, and mental suffering caused by federal officers who entered his home and ef-
fected an arrest by means of unreasonable force.
132. 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (dictum). See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 895, 915 (1978) (holding that federal officers in the executive branch are protected by
only a qualified immunity from claims for damages arising from violation of citizens' consti-
tutional rights).
133. Id. at 382 n.84.
134. 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ely, J., dissenting).
135. This suggestion has been discussed by other legal writers. See Note, At the Border
of Reasonableness.: Searches by Customs Officials, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 880-85 (1968);
Note, Search and Seizure at the Border--the Border Search, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 524-
25 (1967).
136. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
137. Id. at 534.
138. The Court stated that warrants would issue on a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that the health code was being violated in a specified location. The Court stated that
the administrative searches were an intrusion upon "interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment." If the searches were conducted without a warrant, they would "lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual." Id.
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The warrant alternative offers protection for the rights of individual pri-
vacy without unduly frustrating the work of customs officials. Tradition-
ally, frustration of purpose has been a concern to the courts when
considering proposed administrative requirements and was recognized by
the Supreme Court in Camara:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general
exception to the . . . warrant requirement, the question is ...
whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant,
which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search. ' 39
The only frustration of purpose possible in the proposal that a showing of
clear indication be made pursuant to the issuance of a warrant as a prereq-
uisite to a body cavity search lies in the fact that the search might be
delayed. In the interim, the government would risk destruction of the evi-
dence or the possibility of leakage into the body of the suspect if a packet
of narcotics should break."4 A suspect detained 4 ' pending a determina-
tion of clear indication could be kept under constant surveillance to pre-
vent destruction of the evidence. A required warning to such suspects of
the hazards of harboring concentrated narcotics within the body would
serve a twofold purpose: actual warning of the physical dangers involved
and opportunity for the suspect to surrender the contraband.
Since probable cause defies an absolute definitional boundary, clear in-
dication would provide a more workable standard as the level of suspicion
required for the initiation of a body cavity search. This is especially fitting
in the border search context since the officials that would be required to
make a showing of clear indication are familiar with its threshold require-
ments. Clear indication requires that the facts and circumstances present
immediately preceding the proposed body cavity search would lead the
customs official to believe that the suspect has contraband concealed in a
body cavity. It appears likely that those searches initiated on the clear
indication standard would increase the proportion of successful searches,
The Camara court concluded that probable cause to issue a warrant to search must exist as a
check that legislative and administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. The Supreme Court took great strides to
protect the privacy of an individual in his dwelling from any unwarranted administrative
area search. It seems apparent that the privacy of an individual's body would demand the
same, if not more, protection as the house in which he resides. In See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967), a companion case to Camara, the Court held that the same standards and
requirements applied to commercial structures not used as private dwellings. See also
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966), in which Justice Brennan makes this
distinction: "Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than with
state interferences with property relationships or private papers . . . we write on a clean
slate."
139. 387 U.S. at 533.
140. See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert denied, 356 U.S.
914 (1958). The defendant cooperated with customs officials when a packet of heroin burst
in his rectum.
141. The fourth amendment applies to involuntary detention. Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969). Implementation of this proposal would require detention proce-
dures in compliance with fourth amendment requirements.
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necessarily reducing the number of innocent victims intrusively
searched. 4 2 An official who must demonstrate clear indication to a mag-
istrate for issuance of a warrant authorizing a body cavity search would be
less likely to insist on the examination unless he had good reason.
While a strip search is less intrusive than a body cavity search it is none-
theless a personal indignity which, as properly realized by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, demands greater threshold approval than that required for a
nonintrusive border search. 43 The real suspicion test is an unsatisfactory
approach because it is too vague to be effective in the thousands of border
situations arising before the subjective eye of the border inspector. Be-
sides being required to judge the legality of the initiation of the test on the
elusive basis of deciding whether or not their suspicion is real, they also at
a critical point must determine if there is sufficient cause to progress to a
body cavity search. Nevertheless, a properly conducted strip search is
perhaps not sufficiently intrusive to mandate the issuance of a warrant.
Since strip searches occur with much greater frequency than cavity
searches, a warrant requirement might prove an administrative problem.
Although it has been argued that search warrants at the border are not
administratively feasible,'"4 body cavity searches do not occur with suffi-
cient frequency to validate the argument. For the cavity search, the dig-
nity and privacy of the victim can best be protected by subjecting the
proposed invasion to the scrutiny of a disinterested third party, not a
higher ranking customs official, to judge whether the action is merely a
careless display of customs' authority or justifiable under the selected cir-
cumstances. 
45
Since the First Congress contemplated only the searches of ships and
baggage, it is anomalous that the historical argument derived from the se-
quence of customs provisions would today preclude the imposition of judi-
cial control over the initiation of intrusive border searches. The problem
is ripe for solution and unimpeded by the present statutes regulating bor-
der search'" which make no mention of intrusive searches.
142. According to medical testimony, only 15-20% of the cavity probes ever produce con-
traband. See note 127 supra.
143. In United States v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974), the court upheld a strip search by relying on nonintrusive extended border
search authority based on reasonable suspicion that customs laws are being violated.
144. See, e.g., Ittig, The Rites of Passage- Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 40
TENN. L. REv. 329, 358-59 (1973).
145. See generally Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958) (dissenting opinion):
[T]o authorize the ex parte star chamber invasion of body privacy by inspec-
tors at our ports is shocking and abhorrent and is fraught with almost certain
abuse. I fully appreciate the high character of most of the inspectors and the
very difficult duty which is theirs, but the power to subject one entering this
country through its ports to the possibility of such an inquisition and manhan-
dling seems on its face to come within the interdiction of the Fourth Amend-
ment.





Inherent in the nature of border searches is a conflict between individual
personal rights and a legitimate governmental concern. Seemingly, a bal-
ance would be struck between the opposing interests by requiring a show-
ing of clear indication and the issuance of a warrant before a body cavity
search could be performed. Such judicial discretion imposed between
customs officials and the individual would accord more fourth amendment
protection than the present system, which permits initiation of a body cav-
ity search on the basis of the searcher's own subjective determination of
suspicion. The present procedures appear to confirm the suspicion that
the lower courts have lost sight of the meaning of Schmerber, which recog-
nized the integrity and dignity belonging to each individual and cautioned
against the broadening of intrusions allowed in the future.' 47 When the
judiciary sacrifices personal dignity and constitutional rights for the sake
of foolproof law enforcement, the framework upon which the Constitution
rests has been seriously shaken, and perhaps replaced.
147. "The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That
we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an
individual's body ... in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or
intrusions under other conditions." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
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